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Abstract 
Welfare program dependency and expenditures rise during recessions, while income 
tax revenues from working people fall. Thus, now that states are responsible for their own 
welfare programs, they need to know how responsive their citizens are to workplace and 
safety net opportunities. This paper investigates household welfare program and labor 
force participation behavior. A choice-theoretic model is developed and estimated for 
each of the four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) using cross-
sectional data on households, labor markets, and policies. We show that household 
responses to welfare program parameters do differ regionally. But we find that labor 
supply does not depend on welfare program participation or program payoffs. 
Furthermore, unlike under the previous welfare program, participation in Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) does not significantly reduce household labor 
supply. The finding of significant differences across regions justifies the efficiency 
rationale for the devolution of authority to the states. We also discuss how states may be 
able to contain expenditures on welfare programs.  
 
Keywords: labor force participation, regional welfare program participation, state 
welfare policies, TANF, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  
 
  
 
REGIONAL WELFARE PROGRAMS AND  
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
of 1996 gave states responsibility for administering their own versions of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The presumption behind the act is that 
states can better tailor eligibility requirements, benefit levels, and implicit taxes on work 
to their local conditions, making welfare programs more effective at promoting labor 
force participation and self-sufficiency. Indeed, welfare recipiency declined across the 
nation after TANF went into effect (CEA 1997, 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000). State 
welfare rolls, however, declined differentially (Saving and Cox 2000), as illustrated in 
Figure 1. One reason why welfare recipiency has declined more in some states than in 
others is that local economic opportunities differ. This paper investigates two other 
plausible reasons: differences in policies across regions and differences in how house-
holds respond to those policies. 
We first test a (null) hypothesis that households’ labor supply decisions do not de-
pend on their welfare program participation decisions. If this is the case, differences in 
welfare programs across states will not affect state employment outcomes. We test the 
hypothesis by estimating the TANF program and labor supply decisions of thousands of 
categorically eligible households across four census regions of the United States. The 
variations in local labor market opportunities as well as program options across states 
allow us to identify household responses. The corollary null hypothesis is that TANF 
participation does not depend on labor supply. 
The old income support program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or 
AFDC) dampened incentives to work and provided incentives to remain single (see 
Moffitt 1992). Hoynes (1996) found that the labor supply of married-couple households 
was highly responsive to changes in the AFDC benefit structure. Alternatively, Keane  
2 / Huffman and Kilkenny 
 
 
 
Data: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000, Table 626, p. 392, U.S. Census Bureau. 
FIGURE 1. Percentage change in the number of TANF families, 1995–99 
 
 
and Moffitt (1998) found that changes in the wage had a larger effect on discrete labor 
force participation decisions than did changes in AFDC welfare benefits. They estimated 
a structural model of the choices to work and/or participate in multiple welfare programs 
among sole female-headed families. The two studies are reconciled given the evidence 
that the labor supply of singles is considerably less elastic than the labor supply of 
married persons (Heckman 1993). 
The new TANF welfare program requires recipients to work, with some exemptions. 
Welfare program participants cannot substitute program participation for labor force 
participation, if this requirement is enforced or binding. Thus, under TANF, we may 
expect labor force participation to be less sensitive to program instruments. TANF 
participants may, nevertheless, work less than do non-participants.  
The overarching objective is to test if household labor supply and TANF participa-
tion differ systematically across regions. Social mores about single parents or marriage, 
welfare stigma, and work ethics may vary systematically across locations because of 
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Tiebout sorting, for example (Epple, Romer, and Sieg 2001). In addition to variations in 
preferences, workplace opportunities and other safety net options also vary. The effi-
ciency rationale for the devolution of authority over TANF to states (e.g., Brueckner 
2000) is undermined if we find that households in different regions do not respond 
differently to TANF program instruments. If responses do differ, then the optimal levels 
and rates of TANF program instruments also differ, and state-tailored TANF programs 
should be more efficient than a one-size-fits-all program.  
Our research here is similar in spirit to the work of Craig and Palumbo (1999), who 
examine interstate variability in unemployment insurance and welfare policies and 
outcomes from 1973 to 1989 (pre-PRWORA). They focused on states as the decision-
makers and units of observation and concluded that states do make explicit policy 
choices. Here, we focus on households as the decisionmakers.  
To model household choice, we use observations on all low-wealth families in the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The variation across states in TANF 
policy instruments helps to statistically identify variation in household responses. We fit 
four models of household labor supply and welfare program participation, one for each of 
the U.S. census regions. The testable hypotheses are drawn from a model of family 
behavior in which work participation and program participation are each chosen to 
maximize family utility. We estimate this structural model and find significant differ-
ences in responses to at least one TANF program instrument across regions, as well as 
evidence that the new work requirements on TANF participants are binding. 
 
The Choice Theoretic Model 
The head of a household and the spouse, if present, are assumed to choose hours of 
work and to participate in the TANF program to maximize their household’s utility. A 
household’s income support and labor force participation decisions are interdependent. 
Labor supply decisions depend on TANF benefits because the income transfer relaxes the 
household’s budget constraint. TANF participation decisions depend on labor supply 
because the higher is the earned income, the lower are the TANF benefits.  
Following Moffitt (1983) and Hoynes (1996), we define the utility of a family as 
arising quasi-linearly from goods, time at home, and self-respect: 
4 / Huffman and Kilkenny 
 
 U (G, H, S; Z) = U (G, H; Z) + δ(Z)T (1) 
where G denotes purchased goods, H is time at home, and S = δ(Z)T represents self-
respect or stigma, which depends on household characteristics (Z). The indicator T equals 
1 if the family participates in TANF and 0 otherwise, and δ<0 is the marginal disutility or 
stigma of TANF participation. Rational TANF-eligible households will not participate if 
the disutility of doing so outweighs the utility from more goods and/or time at home.  
The Z vector reflects the household’s needs, preferences, and opportunities, such as 
family size, human capital, and local labor demand. For example, Hoynes (2000) exam-
ined the impacts of changes in local labor market conditions on participation in the 
AFDC program in California using the discrete duration models for exits and re-entry to 
welfare. She showed that higher unemployment rates, lower employment growth, and 
lower wage growth are associated with longer welfare spells and higher recidivism rates. 
The state- and household-specific welfare program eligibility and payment criteria 
limit TANF benefits (Bsh) to whichever is lower, the state and household-specific 
benefit maximum Bsh (known as the payment standard) or the excess of Bsh over 
counted income: 
 Bsh = min{ Bsh, Bsh–[bs(WhLh – is)+Nh] }. (2) 
Counted income is household earned income (WhLh) less the earned income disregard (is) 
at the benefit reduction rate (bs) plus unearned household income (Nh), which includes all 
other transfers, such as unemployment insurance. A second state TANF policy instrument 
is is the earned income disregard. It is the dollar amount of earned income not counted 
when calculating household eligibility for transfers. A third TANF policy instrument is 
the benefit reduction rate bs, 0 ≤ bs ≤ 1. This is the rate at which additional dollars of 
earned income reduce the amount transferred. Thus, bs is one way that states limit bene-
fits per household. The earned income disregard is multiplied by bs is a lump-sum 
incentive to work. States can choose the three parameters ( Bsh, bs, is) to tailor their 
welfare programs to control enrollment and budget exposure as well as to provide incen-
tives to eligible householders to work.  
Given the opportunity for TANF income support and state-specific income tax rates, 
ts, the household budget constraint is 
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 (1- Thbs-ts)WhLh + (1-Th-ts)Nh  + Th(bsis + Bsh - Ch)  + debt = PGh (3) 
where Th =1 if the household participates in TANF and 0 otherwise, the vector product 
PGh is the household’s expenditure on goods, and Ch is the household’s out-of-pocket 
costs of participating in TANF. The first term shows that the benefit reduction rate is an 
implicit tax on the earned income of participants. We hypothesize that it would affect the 
labor supply of TANF participants like an income tax. The third term on the left-hand 
side shows that the higher is the implicit tax on earned income through the benefit 
reduction rate, the higher is the value of the earned income disregard. Finally, debt is a 
substitute for income, whether earned, unearned, or transferred. 
Household labor supply, Lh, is the sum of quality-constant or effective hours of work 
by the household head and spouse (if present): Lh = Lwife + eβLhusband, where eβ is the ratio 
of male to female productivity. Likewise, the household wage, Wh, is the female’s wage 
if both spouses are present or the household head is a woman; otherwise it is the male’s 
wage. The household head and spouse, if present, allocate total time, Dh, to work, Lh, or 
stay at home, Hh, Dh = Lh + Hh.  
Households choose the level of goods, time at home (or work time, L), and TANF 
participation, T, to maximize utility (1), internalizing the time constraint, subject to the 
budget constraint (3):  
max
)T,L,(G, λ
 U(G,D-L;Z) + δ(Z)T + λ[(1-Tb-t)WL + (1-T)N  + T(bi + B-C) + debt - PG]  (4) 
(with state and household are dropped for simplicity), where λ is the marginal increment 
to household utility of relaxing the budget constraint (3). The first-order conditions for a 
constrained utility maximum imply, among others, these structural relationships: 
 UL = λ(1 - bT* -t)W, (5) 
 δ(Z) = λ[ B- b(WL*-i) - N - C]. (6) 
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Thus, structural equations for T* and L* are 
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These structural equations outline the main testable hypotheses. First, TANF participation 
depends on labor supply and vice-versa. By (7) we can also hypothesize that TANF 
participation is positively related to payment standards, B, earned-income disregards, i, 
preferences or needs for time at home, (UH(Z) >0), and participation is negatively related 
to benefit reduction rates, b. Also, by (8) and given δ(Z)<0, labor supply is hypothetically 
positively related to wages, W, and negatively related to income tax rates, t, TANF 
participation, T*, benefit levels, and preferences or needs for time at home. Labor supply 
is ambiguous with respect to the benefit reduction rate, b.  
 
The Data 
The model is estimated using data on 6,482 categorically eligible households 
merged with data on local labor markets and state policies. The data about state TANF 
program instruments is collected from Rowe 2000, the 1998 Green Book (U.S. House 
of Representatives 1998), and Gallagher et al. 1998 (Table 1). Information about 
unemployment rates is from the Monthly Labor Review (U.S. Department of Labor 
1997). We use the ratio of the local area unemployment rate to the statewide average in 
the previous ten years as an indicator of local labor market conditions (as suggested by 
an insightful referee). We also include direct measures of states’ non-welfare policy 
instruments such as income tax rates and unemployment insurance benefit levels. The 
data on unemployment insurance is the average weekly benefit for total unemployment 
(Social Security Administration 1998) and data on state-specific individual income 
taxes are from the Council of State Governments (1997).  
The data about individuals and households are from the 1996 SIPP, wave 3. Excluded 
are data on the elderly (>65), households without children, and households with assets 
Regional Welfare Programs and Labor Force Participation / 7 
 
TABLE 1. State TANF and employment outcomes and policy parameters 
State 
% 
TANF 
RUR96 
10-yr Avg. 
Asset Limit 
($) 
Bsh 
($) 
i 
($) 
b 
(%) 
UI 
($) 
IT 
(%) 
Alabama -56 0.67 2,000 137 0 80 142 2 
Alaska -33 0.87 1,000 821 150 67 172 0 
Arizona -50 0.86 2,000 275 90 70 151 2.87 
Arkansas -50 0.73 3,000 162 0 100 170 1 
California -33 0.98 2,000 493 225 50 152 1 
Colorado -63 0.66 2,000 280 120 67 208 4.63 
Connecticut -44 1.01 3,000 443 1157 100 222 3 
Delaware -45 1.19 1,000 270 120 67 224 2.2 
D. Columbia -27 0.99 1,000 298 100 50 236 4.5 
Florida -65 0.82 2,000 241 200 50 178 0 
Georgia -57 0.81 1,000 235 120 67 166 1 
Hawaii -27 1.42 5,000 452 200 44 270 1.4 
Idaho -89 0.77 2,000 276 0 100 182 1.6 
Illinois -50 0.72 3,000 278 0 33 213 3 
Indiana -40 0.62 1,500 229 120 67 187 3.4 
Iowa -37 0.69 5,000 361 0 40 200 0.36 
Kansas -54 0.84 2,000 352 90 60 202 3.5 
Kentucky -43 0.70 2,000 225 120 67 171 2 
Louisiana -52 0.67 2,000 138 1020 100 128 2 
Maine -38 0.72 2,000 312 108 50 171 2 
Maryland -59 0.88 2,000 313 0 65 195 2 
Massachusetts -46 0.73 2,500 474 120 50 254 5.3 
Michigan -53 0.60 3,000 371 200 80 205 4.1 
Minnesota -30 0.79 5,000 437 0 64 234 5.35 
Mississippi -69 0.66 1,000 96 90 100 141 3 
Missouri -43 0.77 5,000 234 120 67 154 1.5 
Montana -55 0.69 3,000 366 200 75 165 2 
Nebraska -27 0.78 6,000 293 0 80 161 2.51 
Nevada -50 0.83 2,000 289 0 50 194 0 
New Hampshire -40 0.85 2,000 481 0 50 153 0 
New Jersey -45 1.07 2,000 322 0 50 255 1.4 
New Mexico -24 0.94 1,500 410 150 50 157 1.7 
New York -36 0.95 2,000 467 90 55 206 4 
North Carolina -54 0.87 3,000 236 120 67 193 6 
North Dakota -40 0.58 5,000 340 0 62 175 2.1 
Ohio -50 0.77 1,000 279 250 50 202 0.743 
Oklahoma -57 0.68 1,000 225 120 50 175 0.5 
Oregon -55 0.84 2,500 427 0 50 191 5 
Pennsylvania -49 0.76 1,000 316 0 50 219 2.8 
Rhode Island -18 0.81 1,000 449 170 50 228  
South Carolina -63 1.06 2,500 160 0 50 165 2.5 
South Dakota -50 0.70 2,000 380 90 80 150 0 
Tennessee -44 0.83 2,000 142 150 100 155 0 
Texas -59 0.78 2,000 163 120 67 189 0 
Utah -38 0.62 2,000 362 100 50 198 2.3 
Vermont -30 0.95 1,000 554 150 75 173  
Virginia -49 0.82 1,000 231 120 67 168 2 
Washington -39 0.84 1,000 440 0 50 210 0 
West Virginia -71 0.71 2,000 201 0 60 176 3 
Wisconsin -89 0.60 2,500 440 120 67 202 4.6 
Wyoming -80 0.73 2,500 320 200 100 181 0 
Sources: TANF participation: U.S. Census Bureau 2000; TANF Instruments: U.S. House of Representatives 1998; 
Gallagher et al. 1998; Unemployment rates: U.S. Department of Labor 1997; Unemployment insurance (UI): Social 
Security Administration 1998; Income tax (IT): The Council of State Governments 1997. 
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above the state TANF eligibility limits (Table 1). The 1996 panel is representative at the 
level of the main census regions, but the sample is insufficient at the state level or lower. 
All household variables are measured in the month of November 1996. These include 
whether the spouse is present, the number of children of various ages, a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not the household lives in a metro area, family unearned 
income, whether or not the household has a car, preexisting debt, and assets. We code a 
household as participating in TANF (Th = 1) if any member is recorded as receiving 
TANF support during November 1996 (children also can be recipients).  
Household composition varies across regions. The Northeast region subsample 
contains observations on 1,038 households, of which 56 percent are married-couple 
families, and 93 percent live in metro areas. The West subset contains 1,534 house-
holds: 62 percent married-couple families, 82 percent metro. The South subset has 
2,361 households: 63 percent married-couple families, 69 percent metro. And the 
Midwest subset has 1,549 households: 68 percent married-couple families, 76 percent 
metro. Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables.  
 
The Empirical Specification 
We estimate the two-equation structural model—equations (7) and (8)—of a dichoto-
mous TANF participation choice, Th, and continuous hours of household labor supply, 
Lh. To test for regional variations, we fit the models to four subsamples of census re-
gions: the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. The variation in TANF and other 
program parameters among the states in each region makes it possible to identify region-
specific responses to state-specific policy instruments.  
The structural hypothesis is that labor supply depends on TANF participation, and 
that TANF participation depends on labor supply. We estimate the system in two stages, 
as in Nelson and Olson (1978). First, we estimate two reduced-form equations, one for a 
household’s TANF participation choice and the other for total household labor supply.  
Because the utility of TANF participation is a latent variable, the reduced-form par-
ticipation choice is estimated by Th = 1 if Th* > 0, and 0 otherwise, where  
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TABLE 2. Definitions, means, and standard deviations of variables  
 Mean (Standard Deviation)  
 Northeast 
(N=1,038) 
Midwest 
(N=1,549) 
South 
(N= 2,361) 
West 
(N=1,534) Description 
Age 36.64  
(8.33) 
35.63 
(8.32) 
35.79 
 (8.65) 
35.86  
(8.55) 
Age of head if single-head family, 
and average age of head and 
spouse if married-couple family 
Agesq 1411.4  
(631.9) 
1338  
(631.25) 
1355.8  
(658.24) 
1358.65  
(646.62) 
Age squared  
B 582.2  
(160.85) 
453.53  
(141.87) 
274.46  
(91.83) 
652.79  
(222.78) 
Maximum TANF grant per month 
in $ 
b 0.49  
(0.12) 
0.58 
(0.16) 
0.52 
 (0.25) 
0.54  
(0.08) 
The rate at which additional 
dollars of earned income reduce 
the TANF benefit 
Car 0.68 
 (0.47) 
0.84  
(0.36) 
0.83  
(0.38) 
0.82  
(0.39) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if a family owns a car, van, or 
truck and 0 otherwise 
Debtk 80.79  
(50.87) 
78.13  
(45.66) 
69.13  
(40.78) 
74.68  
(55.79) 
Total secured debt 
Disabled 0.09  
(0.29) 
0.09  
(0.28) 
0.09  
(0.28) 
0.08  
(0.27) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if family head is disabled and 0 
otherwise 
Edu 12.44  
(2.17) 
12.42  
(2.17) 
11.88  
(2.57) 
11.47  
(3.36) 
Years of schooling of head if 
single family; average years of 
schooling of head and spouse if 
married couple 
i 118.68 
(264.24) 
106.54  
(94.98) 
157.23  
(210.07) 
164.68  
(84.43) 
The dollar amount of earned 
income not counted when 
calculating the household’s 
transfer 
IncTax 3.21 
(1.28) 
2.88 
(1.52) 
1.44 
(1.77) 
1.55 
(1.22) 
State individual low-income tax 
rate (%) 
Kids6 0.70  
(0.81) 
0.71  
(0.85) 
0.70  
(0.83) 
0.81  
(0.89) 
Number of children in family 
younger than age 6  
Kids13 0.75  
(0.88) 
0.83  
(0.92) 
0.77  
(0.88) 
0.87  
(0.95) 
Number of children between ages 
6 and 13  
Kids18 0.52  
(0.75) 
0.50  
(0.72) 
0.50  
(0.72) 
0.48  
(0.72) 
Number of children between ages 
13 and 18  
L 4.01  
(0.52) 
4.09  
(0.55) 
4.07  
(0.50) 
4.03  
(0.53) 
Natural log of hours worked last 
week by head if single, or 
effective hours of work if 
married-couple family 
Ln(wage) 2.22  
(0.44) 
2.23  
(0.43) 
2.07  
(0.41) 
2.21  
(0.45) 
Natural log of hourly wage ($) 
Male 0.60  
(0.49) 
0.68  
(0.47) 
0.69  
(0.46) 
0.70  
(0.46) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if male adult is present in a 
family, and 0 otherwise 
Married 0.56  
(0.50) 
0.68  
(0.47) 
0.63  
(0.48) 
0.62  
(0.48) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if spouse present, and 0 other-
wise 
Metro 0.93  
(0.26) 
0.76  
(0.42) 
0.69  
(0.46) 
0.82  
(0.38) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if a family lives in metro area, 
and 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 2. Continued 
 Mean (Standard Deviation)  
 Northeast 
(N=1,038) 
Midwest 
(N=1,549) 
South 
(N= 2,361) 
West 
(N=1,534) Description 
Nlabinc 53.96  
(126.47) 
44.96  
(112.64) 
17.91  
(54.85) 
48.53  
(135) 
Family non-labor income 
exclusive of welfare transfers 
per month ($) 
PL 3.91 
(0.33) 
4.04 
(0.33) 
4.03  
(0.32) 
3.92 
(0.30) 
Predicted natural log of hours 
worked last week by head if 
single, or effective hours of 
work if married couple family 
( hLˆ , see text) 
PT 0.15 
(0.22) 
0.15 
(0.21) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
Predicted TANF participation 
( hTˆ , see text) 
T  0.16  
(0.36) 
0.15  
(0.36) 
0.12  
(0.32) 
0.17  
(0.37) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if a household participates in 
TANF, and 0 otherwise 
U 0.90  
(0.12) 
0.71  
(0.07) 
0.80  
(0.10) 
0.91  
(0.11) 
Ratio of the area unemployment 
rate to the state’s past ten-year 
average unemployment rate 
UI 221.68 
(21.89) 
199.77 
(21.50) 
173.89 
(19.25) 
164.09 
(21.59) 
State average weekly benefit for 
total unemployment 
White 0.71  
(0.45) 
0.79  
(0.40) 
0.68  
(0.47) 
0.83  
(0.38) 
Dichotomous variable equal to 1 
if family head is white, and 0 
otherwise 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 Th*= XαT1  + µT1. (9)  
Using probit, the probability of TANF participation is Prob(Th=1) = /2 
2
2
1 α
π
X−e . The 
explanatory variables (vector X) include the Z vector of exogenous variables such as 
household demographic characteristics, labor market characteristics, and the state tax and 
policy variables. The estimated function XαT1 serves as the instrument for hTˆ  in the 
second-stage structural equation for labor supply.  
The labor supply model is more complex. First, because observed wages also are en-
dogenous to the choice to work, we have to control for this self-selection bias by 
estimating the inverse Mills ratio from a probit model of the probability that individual 
“i” works:  
 Prob(worki) = 2/
2
2
1 βX we−
π
 (10) 
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where Xw = {agei, agei2, educationi, malei, whitei, metroi, number of children under age 6, 
age 6-12, age 13-18, marriedi, non-labor income, and the relative area unemployment rate}. 
This function is estimated for each individual household head and each spouse (if pre-
sent). Then an inverse Mills ratio, λLi, is found as the ratio of the cumulative normal 
density function divided by the probability density function for each individual.  
Next, an instrument for W, the return per hour to each individual’s labor, is estimated 
as an ordinary least squares function of human capital, demographics, and labor market 
variables: 
 ln(wagei) = β0 + β1D + β2U + β3λL  + µw (11) 
where D is a vector of demographic variables, U is the relative area unemployment rate, 
λL is the inverse Mills ratio controlling for self-selection into the labor force, and µw is a 
normal random error term. Third, assuming that wages reflect productivity, we use the 
coefficient βmale, estimated in (11), to construct the productivity-weighted total effective 
household labor supply. 
The wage equations estimated for each region are reported in Table 3. The joint test 
that all the non-intercept coefficients (except for the coefficient on the selection term) are 
zero is rejected. The sample F-values, compared to the critical value 1.75, are 6.20 
(Northeast), 22.32 (Midwest), 29.73 (South), and 10.11 (West).  
Wages are concave in age, peaking at age 55 in the Northeast, compared to age 52 in 
the West, age 49 in the South, and age 46 in the Midwest. The coefficients with respect to 
the other variables are also consistent with other labor studies (Neal and Johnson 1996; 
Blau and Kahn 2000). Wages are higher for males and whites. We find other interesting 
regional variations as well. One additional year of schooling (higher labor productivity) 
has the direct effect of increasing the wage by 5.8 percent in the Midwest, 4.4 percent in 
the South, 4.1 percent in the Northeast, and 3.6 percent in the West. Wages for metro 
householders are higher than for non-metro householders by 7 percent in the West, 6.8 
percent in the Midwest, 4.5 percent for the Northeast, and 3.9 percent for the South.  
Having defined household labor supply in terms of female labor units as Lh = Lwife 
+ eβmaleLhusband, we use the βmale estimated in equation (11) in eβmale for the ratio of male 
to female productivity (Griliches 1970). Thus, in households with a female head or if  
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TABLE 3. Estimates of the wage (lnwage) 
 Northeast Midwest South West 
Intercept 0.559  -0.229  0.105  0.859  
 (0.476) (0.303) (0.277) (0.282)*** 
Age 0.040 0.066  0.040  0.036  
 (0.016)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
Agesq -0.0004 -0.0007  -0.0004  -0.0003  
 (0.0002)* (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Edu 0.041  0.058  0.044  0.036  
 (0.013)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
White -0.009  0.077  0.073  0.030  
 (0.041)  (0.035)** (0.020)*** (0.041) 
Metro 0.045  0.068  0.039  0.070 
 (0.055) (0.026)*** (0.019)** (0.032)** 
Male 0.163 0.222  0.226  0.115  
 (0.054)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)*** (0.039)*** 
U 0.025 0.007  0.381  0.023  
 (0.136) (0.145) (0.013)*** (0.127) 
λw 0.071  0.161  0.074  -0.209 
 (0.182) (0.125) (0.110) (0.151) 
     
R2 0.108 0.172 0.171 0.162 
F Statistic 10.97 35.20 47.72 28.77 
Number of 
observations 736 1,366 1,863 1,204 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% 
level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
both spouses work, the instrumented female wage is the appropriate measure of the 
“household” wage. If the household head is male and the spouse does not work, the 
household labor supply is the male’s labor supply, and the instrument is the male’s 
estimated wage. The aggregate defaults to female hours and the female’s estimated 
wage in households with no working male.  
Next, we estimate the first-stage, reduced-form model of aggregate household labor 
supply ln(Lh) as a linear function of all the exogenous variables (X) plus the labor force 
self-selection term λL estimated in equation (11) using ordinary least squares:  
 ln(Lh) = XγL +  γλλ +  ε. (12) 
The estimated function will be used to instrument hLˆ in the structural equation for TANF 
participation. 
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Finally, the two instruments ( hTˆ , hLˆ ) are included as arguments in the structural 
equations:  
 Prob (Th=1) = /2 
2
2
1 φ
π
X−e ,  (13) 
 ln(Lh) = γ0 + γ1 )ˆln( hgeaw +γ2 hTˆ +  γ3 YL + γ4FL+ γ5ZL + γ6λL + µL (14) 
where Xφ is φ0 + φl hLˆ  + φ 2YT +  φ3FT+ φ4ZT +  µT. The vectors YL and YT are local 
employment opportunity variables, FL and FT are local fiscal policy tax and transfer 
variables, and ZL and ZT are other household characteristics.  
The system is estimated equation by equation using probit for the TANF participa-
tion equation and least squares for labor supply. The instrument for hLˆ  in the structural 
TANF equation (13) is predicted hours of labor (equation [12]), and the instrument for 
hTˆ  that enters the structural labor supply equation (14) is the function αX ˆT  (equation [9]). 
Nelson and Olson (1978) have shown that the estimates obtained by this procedure are 
consistent. Furthermore, because we include the self-selection term λL in (14), the error 
term µL has a zero mean. If it were estimated without taking into account the probability 
of self-selection, it would not have a zero mean, and parameter estimates would be biased 
and inconsistent.  
The exact empirical specifications of structural equations of the choice variables are 
shown in Tables 4 and 6. Note that education is excluded from the labor-force participa-
tion equation (14) to identify the wage effect in labor supply, because it was included in 
equation (11) to estimate the wage, according to the convention in labor research (Keeley 
1981; Heckman 1993). 
 
Estimation Results 
TANF Program Participation  
Estimates of the instrumental variables in welfare participation (equation [13]) are 
presented in Table 4. Opportunities, needs, and preferences explain TANF participa-
tion in intuitively reasonable ways that echo the findings in the existing literature. In 
all regions, if the family head is male and if he has more years of education, then the 
probability that the family participates in TANF is statistically significantly lower. 
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TABLE 4. Instrumental variable estimates of TANF program participation 
 Northeast Midwest South West 
Intercept 13.595 
(3.085)*** 
18.755 
(4.741)*** 
13.713 
(2.576)*** 
12.932 
(2.517)*** 
Age -0.057 
(0.031)*     
-0.043 
(0.023)* 
0.041 
(0.017)** 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
Agesq 0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009 
(0.0003)*** 
0.0005 
(0.0003)* 
Male -1.010 
(0.401)**  
-0.131 
(0.318) 
-0.330 
(0.225) 
-0.221 
(0.216) 
Married 1.948 
(0.591)*** 
1.903 
(0.655)*** 
1.857 
(0.416)*** 
1.049 
(0.324)*** 
Kids6 0.070  
(0.117)  
0.032 
(0.084) 
0.182 
(0.063)*** 
0.061 
(0.072) 
Kids13 0.219 
(0.104)** 
0.004 
(0.069) 
-0.013 
(0.055) 
0.008 
(0.069) 
Kids18 0.199 
(0.119)* 
0.108 
(0.092) 
0.218 
(0.063)*** 
-0.208 
(0.084)** 
Nlabinc -0.001 
(0.0005)* 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0007)** 
-0.001 
(0.0004)*** 
Edu -0.057 
(0.032)* 
-0.001 
(0.031) 
-0.009 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.015)      
Debtk -0.005 
(0.003)* 
-0.009 
(0.002)*** 
-0.006 
(0.002)*** 
-0.004 
(0.001)*** 
Car -0.401 
(0.159)** 
-0.209 
(0.185) 
-0.062 
(0.138) 
-0.180 
(0.142) 
PL -3.510 
(0.861)*** 
-4.706 
(1.326)*** 
-4.415 
(0.780)*** 
-3.928 
(0.682)*** 
U 1.336 
(0.575)** 
-0.856 
(0.755) 
1.311 
(0.485)** 
-0.389 
(0.724) 
B 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.0005)*** 
0.001 
(0.0004)** 
b -1.973 
(2.218) 
-0.065 
(0.434) 
-0.132 
(0.209) 
0.948 
(0.904) 
i -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0008)* 
0.0005 
(0.0002)** 
0.001 
(0.001) 
     
Log Likelihood  -278.39 -416.46 -587.15 -456.20 
Number of observations 1,038 1,549 2,361 1,534 
Note: PL is the predicted household labor supply. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% 
level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Debt appears to substitute for TANF participation in all regions, as hypothesized. A 
family with very young children is more likely to participate in TANF and less likely 
to be in the labor force. Families with cars are less likely to participate in TANF and 
more likely to work. And most important, for all regions, the more a household works, 
the lower is the probability that the family participates in TANF. 
There are some regional differences. In particular, higher nonlabor income signifi-
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cantly decreases the probability of TANF participation in all but the Midwest. And the 
probability of participation in TANF significantly increases with unusually high 
unemployment rates in the Northeast and South.  
Furthermore, the response to policy instruments varies across regions. In all re-
gions, TANF participation is positively related to the TANF payment standard ( Bsh) as 
hypothesized. But the effect is statistically significant only in the South and West. 
TANF participation is significantly related to the earned income disregard (is) only in 
the Midwest and the South. Neither TANF participation nor labor supply appears to be 
statistically significantly sensitive to the benefit reduction rate (bs), the implicit tax on 
earned income.  
The test for significantly different behavioral responses across regions was con-
structed as follows. Under the null hypothesis, irϕ - ikϕ  = 0 for each explanatory 
variable i, pairwise for regions r and k. The test statistic is  
 t = 
22 )ˆ()ˆ(
)()ˆˆ(
kr
krkr
SESE ϕϕ
ϕϕϕϕ
+
−−−  =
)d(S
)ˆˆ(
iff
kr ϕϕ −  
(with variable subscripts i dropped for ease of exposition). Table 5 summarizes our 
findings about differences in regional TANF program participation at the 5 percent level 
of significance. 
Northern and southern poor are significantly more sensitive to higher unemployment 
rates than are midwestern poor. Midwestern poor are less likely to go off TANF at  
higher levels of unearned income (such as alimony or child support) than are southern or 
western poor. Midwestern poor are also less sensitive to the income disregard TANF 
policy parameter that encourages work. Southern household participation in TANF 
differs significantly with respect to the life cycle: TANF participation is concave with 
respect to age in the South and convex (with lowest participation rates among the middle-
aged) elsewhere. This is consistent with the convex life-cycle TANF participation profile 
among rural households identified by Kilkenny and Huffman (2003). And, having more 
teenaged children (“age18”) discourages TANF participation in the West but encourages 
it in the other three regions. And, among northerners only, having less education signifi-
cantly increases the probability that the household participates in TANF.  
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TABLE 5. Significant differences in TANF behavior among regions  
TANF participation in COLUMN region is less positively 
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Labor Supply 
While TANF participation is sensitive to state-specific TANF program parameters 
and labor supply, labor supply is not significantly sensitive to state tax or unemployment 
insurance rates in any of the regions. Our finding that labor supply is not significantly 
related to the TANF policy’s benefit reduction rate is consistent with the recent literature 
that labor supply is ambiguous with respect to implicit taxes (Moffitt 2002).  
Table 6 shows the instrumental variable labor supply equations (equation [14]) for each 
census region. The response of household labor supply to an increase in the return to labor 
( ˆln( )wage ) is positive as hypothesized, but it is statistically significant only in the Mid-
west. We estimate the elasticity of TANF-eligible household labor supply with respect to 
the wage to be 0.033. That is, a doubled return to female labor (+100 percent) is associated 
with a 3 percent increase in the total hours worked by a TANF-eligible midwestern house-
hold. Gender matters with respect to labor supply in the Midwest and the West, where the 
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TABLE 6. Instrumental variable estimates of the labor supply (lnhours) 
 Northeast Midwest South West 
Intercept 3.647 
(0.415)*** 
3.629 
(0.346)*** 
3.803 
(0.184)*** 
3.368 
(0.373)*** 
Age -0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.0005 
(0.006) 
Agesq -0.0000 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.00005)** 
-0.00001 
(0.0001) 
Male 0.063 
(0.122) 
0.210 
(0.086)** 
0.045 
(0.074) 
0.154 
(0.087)* 
Married 0.486 
(0.077)*** 
0.422 
(0.065)*** 
0.507 
(0.048)*** 
0.356 
(0.067)*** 
Kids6 -0.019 
(0.037) 
-0.067 
(0.029)** 
-0.008 
(0.028) 
-0.024 
(0.022) 
Kids13 0.027 
(0.023) 
-0.048 
(0.019)** 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.043 
(0.018)** 
Kids18 0.037 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
Disabled -0.157 
(0.082)** 
-0.048 
(0.064) 
-0.139 
(0.054)** 
-0.164 
(0.066)** 
Car 0.063 
(0.052) 
0.099 
(0.051)* 
0.116 
(0.037)*** 
0.125 
(0.050)** 
Nlabinc -0.00004 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001)* 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001)* 
ˆln( )wage  0.021 
(0.038) 
0.033 
(0.019)* 
-0.030 
(0.025) 
0.032 
(0.025) 
PT -0.033 
(0.044) 
-0.024 
(0.034) 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
-0.031 
(0.038) 
λW -0.012 
(0.287) 
0.182 
(0.199) 
-0.329 
(0.144)** 
0.076 
(0.229) 
U 0.028 
(0.145) 
0.138 
(0.197) 
0.188 
(0.125) 
-0.220 
(0.196) 
UI -0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
IT -0.017 
(0.012) 
0.025 
(0.014)* 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
b -0.105 
(0.118) 
-0.089 
(0.120) 
-0.049 
(0.048) 
0.283 
(0.218) 
     
R2 0.333 0.283 0.322 0.251 
F Statistic 23.80 30.16 55.81 24.21 
Number of observations 827 1,318 2,017 1,248 
Note: PT is the predicted TANF participation. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at 
the 10 % level. **Statistically significant at the 5 % level. ***Statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
 
 
household works more hours if the head is male. These results are consistent with the labor 
supply literature. Blundell and Macurdy (1999) report that the elasticity of labor supply 
with respect to the wage is close to zero for men and is positive for women.  
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Labor supply is greatly enhanced by the presence of a two-parent family. It is sig-
nificantly higher if both spouses are present (“Married”), and lower if the household 
head is disabled (see also Heckman 1993). Also, labor supply is concave in age in the 
South but not statistically significant with respect to age in the other regions. The older 
is the midwestern (southern) householder with younger children, the fewer are the 
hours worked. Other differences include that one additional child under age 6 decreases 
midwestern household hours of work by 6.7 percent, while in the Northeast, South, and 
West, the effects of additional children on labor supply are not statistically significant.  
The household’s having access to a car significantly increases the hours of labor 
supplied in all regions except the Northeast. This may be because of the higher levels of 
public transport available in the Northeast, but a more detailed investigation of this 
effect is needed.  
 
Conclusions 
We have posed and estimated a model of household labor supply and TANF pro-
gram participation in the four census regions. According to our estimates, the null 
hypotheses that household decisions to work are independent of decisions to participate 
in welfare cannot be rejected. We find no statistically significant evidence that labor 
supply depends on TANF program participation or program payoffs. Welfare program 
participants do not work systematically less than non-participants, all else being equal. 
This was one of the goals of welfare reform. Variations in welfare program benefits and 
implicit taxes on earned income are no longer significant determinants of employment 
outcomes across states.  
Our findings that TANF benefit rates and TANF participation no longer affect labor 
supply contrast with pre-reform findings that household labor supply was sensitive to 
AFDC benefit rates (Keane and Moffitt 1998, Hoynes 2000). The difference between the 
old welfare program and the TANF program that may account for this change in sensitiv-
ity is the new requirement that all TANF participants work. If this requirement binds, 
other inducements or deterrents may be irrelevant. Our findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the TANF work requirements bind. 
Furthermore, higher wages encourage increased labor supply by poor households 
only in the Midwest, where both spouses are more often present. The most significant 
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determinants of hours worked are the number of dependents (spouse and children) 
relative to other sources of income in the household. These findings imply that American 
poor work only as much as they must to support their children and other dependents. 
These households also work less if they have more unearned income or credit: they 
substitute unearned for earned income. But they are not allowed to substitute welfare 
benefits for earned income under the TANF program. And again, our evidence shows that 
they do not work less when they are receiving TANF benefits. 
We reject, however, the null hypothesis that state policies have no affects on house-
hold participation in TANF. Furthermore, we reject the null hypothesis that households in 
all regions respond similarly to TANF policy instruments. These findings support the 
efficiency rationale for the devolution of authority over TANF to the states. Since house-
hold responses to welfare program parameters do differ regionally, state-tailored TANF 
programs could be more efficient at controlling TANF budget outlays than a one-size-
fits-all nationwide program.  
Because TANF participation is significantly (inversely) related to working and posi-
tively related to local unemployment rates, TANF participation will increase during 
economic contractions. Workplace opportunities matter; dependence on welfare is not 
entirely a lifestyle choice. But it is a choice to some extent, so state governments can 
influence the participation rate by setting payment caps and implicit tax rates. In the South 
and West, a decrease in the payment standard ( Bsh) would lead to decreased TANF partici-
pation (and decreased outlays on the TANF program). Indeed, from 1997 to 2000, states in 
the West reduced pay standards, and welfare participation declined during those years (U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services 2000). In the South, a decrease in the earned income 
disregard would also discourage TANF participation (and reduce outlays). The options for 
the Midwest are the reverse; the earned income disregard could be increased to discourage 
TANF participation. As Table 1 makes clear, one southern state, Louisiana, offered an 
unusually high earned income disregard, while many of the midwestern states offered no 
earned income disregards at all in 1996. Finally, our estimates suggest that all states could 
raise benefit reduction rates (bs), an implicit tax on earned income, without encouraging 
more TANF participation or discouraging labor force participation. This could help states 
contain the budget deficits that rise during recessions. 
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